Diplomacy and War at NATO: The Secretary General and Military Action After the Cold War
Ryan C. Hendrickson
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Martin’s Press, 2000). 16. Hastings Lionel Ismay, The Memoirs of General Lord Ismay (New York: Viking Press, 1960), 458; Acheson, quoted in Jordan, Political Leadership in NATO, 8. NATO’s Cold War Secretary General 15 Lisbon meeting in February 1952, NATO sought to rectify this problem through the creation of the civilian position of secretary general to provide political guidance and leadership to the alliance. Since NATO operates by consensus, each member state still had veto power over all decisions, but when acting on behalf of a specific NAC decision, the secretary general could provide political guidance to NATO’s military authorities, including the SACEUR.
Sells, The Bridge Betrayed (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996); Christopher Bennett, Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse: Causes, Course and Consequences (New York: New York University Press, 1995). 8. James A. Baker III with Thomas M. DeFrank, The Politics of Diplomacy (New York: Putnam, 1995), 651; Baker, quoted in Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: Random House, 1998), 27. 9. Barton Gellman, “U. S. Military Fears Balkan Intervention,” New York Times, August 12, 1992, A24; Ronald D. Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 21.
Although it reiterated that NATO’s primary mission remained the defense of its member states, the new Strategic Concept indicated that NATO was evolving toward something markedly different from its Cold War identity. 17 But as the United Nations remained the political and diplomatic center of action, the worsening crisis in the Balkans increasingly became viewed as a test of whether NATO could address this post–Cold War challenge in Europe, and of whether NATO could adapt to its newly stated missions.
Joseph L. Kunz, “Privileges and Immunities of International Organizations,” American Journal of International Law 41, no. 4 (1947): 828–73. 25. Daalder and O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 45; Javier Solana, “Statement to the Press by the Secretary General following Decision on the ACTORD,” October 13, 1998, NATO, http://www. nato. int/docu/speech/1998/s981013a. htm. 102 Diplomacy and War at NATO Solana’s diplomatic achievement within the NAC resulted from his ability to find consensus using the semantic ambiguity of the phrase “sufficient legal basis.
Some ambassadors note that the scandal proved damaging to Claes’s ability to lead the alliance, simultaneously tarnishing NATO’s credibility at a time when it badly needed legitimacy. 16 Although the European allies considered the accusations more serious than did the Americans, it appears that few doubted Claes’s commitment to seeing the alliance succeed in Bosnia. The consensus view is that Claes was still able to lead the alliance internally prior to and during Operation Deliberate Force, although the allies recognized that his association with bribery would eventually force his removal from office.